Hampden Real Estate v. Metro Mgmt Grp by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-6-2007 
Hampden Real Estate v. Metro Mgmt Grp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"Hampden Real Estate v. Metro Mgmt Grp" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 260. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/260 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 06-4052
             
HAMPDEN REAL ESTATE, INC., General Partner; JAGDISH BANSAL;
ASHOK LUHADIA; INDU GARG; ANIL GUPTA, Limited Partners, trading as
Hampden Enterprises, L.P., A New Jersey Limited Partnership,
                                                                                       Appellants
   v.
METROPOLITAN MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.;
SKYLINE APARTMENTS, LLC, A PA. Limited
Liability Company; KEVIN TIMOCHENKO
             
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-01160)
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson
             
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 26, 2007
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  November 6, 2007)
             
OPINION
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
A jury decided that Metropolitan Management Group, Inc. (“Metropolitan”) (the
buyer) was entitled to the fund of approximately $120,000 held in escrow pursuant to its
purchase of a residential property.  The seller, Hampden Real Estate. Inc. (“Hampden”),
appeals from the District Court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment and/or
motion in limine, and its motion for post-trial relief.  The District Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
will affirm.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the proceedings,
we do not restate the facts in detail.  The amended Agreement of Sale (the “Sale
Agreement”) by which Hampden sold the residential property to Metropolitan provided
that the property would cost $3.7 million, that Metropolitan would assume Hampden’s
mortgage on the property, and that Hampden would receive a credit of $120,549.78.  The
credit was held in escrow pursuant to Hampden’s mortgage.
The parties executed the Sale Agreement on September 24, 2001, and closed on
November 28, 2001.  During the intervening time period, the parties negotiated the
purchase price to reflect costs required to repair the property.  During these negotiations,
the parties viewed a draft and a final version of a HUD-1 Settlement Statement prepared
by the closing agent.  The final Settlement Statement did not show the escrow amount
among the itemized debits and credits.
After closing, Hampden made a demand for payment of the escrow amount, which
3Metropolitan refused.  Hampden then filed suit, claiming breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and conversion.  Metropolitan counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.  The  District Court granted
Hampden’s partial motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim and
dismissed its remaining claims as moot.  It denied Metropolitan’s cross-motion for
summary judgment on all counts.
On Metropolitan’s appeal of the District Court’s order with respect to the breach of
contract claim, we held that the parol evidence rule did not preclude testimony that the
parties had intended for the Settlement Statement to modify the Sale Agreement.  Because 
we concluded that the parties’ intention to modify the Sale Agreement was a material
issue of fact, we reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, and remanded
for further proceedings.  Hampden Real Estate, Inc. v. Metro. Mgmt. Group, Inc., 142 F.
App’x 600 (3d Cir. 2005).
On remand, the District Court reopened discovery and permitted the deposition
testimony of Metropolitan’s CEO, Kevin Timochenko.  The District Court denied the
parties’ renewed cross-motions for summary  judgment and Hampden’s motion in limine.
The  matter proceeded to trial.  The jury determined that the parties had modified the
original Sale Agreement, and returned a verdict for Metropolitan.  The District Court then
denied Hampden’s motion for post-trial relief.  Hampden appeals.
Hampden first argues that the District Court erred by failing to grant its motion for
summary judgment.  Our review of the District Court’s denial of summary judgment is
4plenary, and we apply the same standard of review as the District Court.  Given the
Settlement Statement and the deposition testimony of Timochenko that prior to closing
the parties were negotiating the “number [he] was willing to pay for the property,” there
were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute.  App. at 6.  These included:
whether the parties intended to delete the escrow provision from the final contract;
whether the parties intended to orally modify the Sale Agreement; and whether the
Settlement Statement was intended to modify the Sale Agreement.  Accordingly,
Hampden was not entitled to summary judgment.
Hampden also contends that it was entitled to a new trial or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence failed to establish that the parties
intended to modify the Sale Agreement.  We review the District Court’s denial of the
motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard.  A new trial should be
granted “only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of
justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our
conscience.”  Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991).  The
verdict does not meet this standard.
Contrary to Hampden’s contention, there was sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the parties intended to exclude the escrow amount.  During trial,
Timochenko testified that after executing the Sale Agreement Metropolitan discovered
numerous defects in the property.  Further, Timochenko gave detailed testimony about the
price negotiations that followed this discovery.  Hampden counters that the escrow
5amount was never mentioned during these negotiations.  From this, it concludes that no
reasonable jury could have found that the parties intended the final sale price to exclude
that amount.  In light of the defects to the property, the heated negotiations that preceded
closing, and the fact that the final Settlement Statement did not include the escrow
amount, we cannot conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict.
Similarly, the District Court did not err in denying Hampden’s motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  For the same reasons discussed above, there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that the final sale price did not
include the escrow amount.
Hampden further contends that the District Court erred in denying its motion in
limine and allowing Timochenko’s testimony.  We review the District Court’s ruling to
admit evidence for abuse of discretion.  Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 553 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Under this deferential standard, we will not disturb the District Court’s exercise of
discretion unless there is a clear error or “no reasonable person would adopt the district
court’s view.”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
Unless otherwise barred, relevant evidence is admissible, and relevant evidence is
any evidence that tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable.  See Fed. R.
Evid. 401, 402 & 403.  There can be little doubt that Timochenko’s testimony was highly
relevant to the central issue in this case: whether the parties intended to modify their
6original agreement.   In our earlier holding in this case, we held that the parol evidence
rule does not preclude evidence of subsequent oral modifications.  Specifically, we stated
that “the parol evidence rule does not preclude testimony regarding the parties[’] intention
to alter the final purchase price by executing a Settlement Statement, after the execution
of the Sale Agreement, which omitted the Escrow Account Credit.”  Hampden Real
Estate, 142 F. App’x at 602-03.  Timochenko’s testimony was evidence of post-execution
negotiations, and thus the parol evidence rule does not provide a basis for its exclusion.
Finally, Hampden contends that the District Court erred by submitting confusing
interrogatories to the jury.  Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
no party may assign error to jury instructions unless it objected thereto.  Failure to object
to an instruction at the time the jury receives it constitutes a waiver of this objection. 
Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. Ebi Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 463 (3d Cir. 1999).
Because Hampden failed to object during trial, we review for plain error.  Watson
v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court presented the
interrogatories in a clear and logical fashion.  Moreover, given the fact that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the parties did modify the Sale
Agreement, we are unable to find any plain error.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
